

The blinking spotlight of attention

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Increasing evidence suggests that attention can concurrently select multiple locations; yet it is not clear whether this ability relies on continuous allocation of attention to the different targets (a “parallel” strategy) or whether attention switches rapidly between the targets (a periodic “sampling” strategy). Here, we propose a method to distinguish between these two alternatives. The human psychometric function for detection of a single target as a function of its duration can be used to predict the corresponding function for two or more attended targets. Importantly, the predicted curves differ, depending on whether a parallel or sampling strategy is assumed. For a challenging detection task, we found that human performance was best reflected by a sampling model, indicating that multiple items of interest were processed in series at a rate of approximately seven items per second. Surprisingly, the data suggested that attention operated in this periodic regime, even when it was focused on a single target. That is, attention might rely on an intrinsically periodic process.

oscillation | parallel vs. serial

Selective attention denotes the ability to enhance processing of a particular location or object. In recent years a number of studies have suggested that multiple locations can be concurrently attended (1–6). In most of these cases, however, it is difficult to distinguish a true (i.e., sustained) division of the attentional spotlight, from a strategy in which a single attentional focus would switch rapidly between the different targets. Indeed, both strategies could explain the occurrence of classic “set size effects” (i.e., decreases of performance with increasing number of attended items) either because attention is a limited resource (“parallel” strategy), or because the effective time that attention samples each object decreases when several objects must be attended (“sampling” strategy). With respect to visual search tasks, in which a single target must be detected among a variable number of elements, this debate has divided the community for quite some time, with no accepted conclusion [Sternberg S (1973) in *Annual Meeting of the Psychonomics Society* in St. Louis, MO, and refs. 8–14]. A similarly unresolved argument has been made regarding multiple-object tracking paradigms (15–18).

Here, we propose a quantitative strategy for distinguishing between these alternatives: The psychometric function for detection of a single target as a function of its duration can be used to predict the expected psychometric function for multiple targets, and the predicted shape is quite different for parallel and sequential strategies. We can thus determine which strategy best describes the performance of human observers with multiple attended items. The mathematical details of this method are given in [supporting information \(SI\) Appendix](#), but the underlying idea can also be understood in simple terms. A “probe” event of variable duration must be detected by the observer (Fig. 1). When only a single location is cued, the observer can allocate their attentional resources entirely to this location (“full attention” condition). In other trials, there can be two or more cued locations (“divided attention” condition; note that the term “divided” refers here to a particular experimental instruction, independent of the attentional allocation strategy—parallel or sequential—chosen by the subject). Finally, on catch trials, the

probe occurs in an uncued, unexpected location (“minimal attention” condition). Within a “parallel” model, attention is shared across the targets so performance for a given probe duration will lie somewhere between the performance levels obtained with full and with minimal attention at this same duration (Fig. 2A). As the number of cued locations increases, the psychometric function will move closer to the function found for minimal attention (governed by a parameter we call the division cost). For a “sampling” strategy, performance is again a mixture of the full and minimal attention functions but in a manner determined by the location of attention at the onset of the probe and the rate at which it moves from one cued location to the next. Each successive sample, whether directed to the location of the probe or one of the other cued locations, might temporally overlap with the probe for a certain duration, drawing a corresponding contribution from the “full” or the “minimal attention” functions, respectively (see Fig. 2B and C for examples and [SI Appendix](#) for a more detailed description).

We consider two versions of the “sampling” model. According to the “sample-when-divided” version (Fig. 2B), the periodic sampling strategy is used only when more than one item must be attended; for a single attended item, even at long durations, attention will sample the probe for its entire duration. This reflects the classic idea of a switching “spotlight” of attention (19–22). According to the “sample-always” version (Fig. 2C), periodic sampling occurs even when only one item is attended: At long durations the probe is not sampled continuously, but in a succession of epochs whose information is combined (by probability summation) before the decision is made (for convenience, the “duty cycle” of this periodic sampling process was assumed to be 1, i.e., there was no “off” time between successive samples). The psychometric curve at set size 1, in this case, is already the result of a temporal sampling process, and so another full-attention curve must be hypothesized (and ultimately computed, based on the observed performance at set size 1; see [SI Appendix](#)). Such systematic sampling could occur, for example, if the interplay between information sampling and information processing stages restricted information transmission to particular moments. Although such a strategy might seem inefficient, the idea is supported by recent findings suggesting that certain forms of motion perception, for a single moving element, could rely on attentional sampling at a more-or-less fixed rate (23, 24). Overall, we thus compared 3 models (parallel, sample-always, sample-when-divided) and attempted to determine which model could best explain human performance in a contrast decrement detection task with multiple potential target locations. Two different contrast decrement strengths were used, resulting in an

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“easier” and a more “difficult” version of the task. (As we will see later, these two versions entail different attentional requirements, as defined by visual search slopes: efficient search for the easy task, inefficient search for the difficult task.). Each model was given a single free parameter: the sampling period (from 50 ms to 1,000 ms) for the two sampling models, a division cost parameter (from 0 to 1) for the parallel model, reflecting the cost in performance for sharing attention with each additional target. The entire parameter space was explored, and the best parameter value (i.e., the value that generated a prediction closest to the performance of a given human observer) was determined for each model. The model with the lowest prediction error is likely to reflect the attentional allocation strategy used by our observers.

Psychometric functions from one representative subject are shown in Fig. 3. Over the group of eight subjects, a three-way ANOVA (task difficulty \times set size \times probe duration) confirms that the probability of detecting the probe increases with increasing duration [$F(5, 336) = 553.4, P < 0.0001$] and that it is also affected by set size [$F(3, 336) = 9.9, P < 0.0001$]. Importantly, although task difficulty had a main effect on performance [$F(1, 336) = 346.5, P < 0.0001$] and significantly interacted with probe duration [i.e., affected the slope and/or the threshold of the psychometric functions; $F(5, 336) = 36.0, P < 0.0001$], it did not reduce the effects of set size [$F(3, 336) = 0.2, P = 0.9$]. We can thus investigate, both for the difficult and easy versions of the task, the attentional strategy that led to these significant set size effects. The same three-way ANOVA for performance obtained in the “minimal attention” condition (when the probe appeared at one of the uncued locations) again revealed a main effect of probe duration [$F(5, 252) = 136.1, P < 0.0001$] and of task difficulty [$F(1, 252) = 108.5, P < 0.0001$], but no main effect of set size [$F(2, 252) = 0.5, P = 0.59$] and no interaction between set size and task difficulty [$F(2, 252) = 1.2, P = 0.31$]. This is somewhat expected: Set size determines the division of attentional resources among the cued elements, but should not affect what goes on outside of the focus of attention. Thus, we collapsed the minimal attention data across set sizes (Fig. 3).

A two-way ANOVA (model type \times task difficulty) revealed no main effect of task difficulty [$F(1, 42) = 0.31, P > 0.5$] on prediction accuracy but a significant effect of model type [$F(2, 42) = 11.9, P < 0.0001$] and a significant interaction [$F(2, 42) = 3.23, P < 0.05$], showing that the various models' ability to predict experimental data depended on task difficulty (Fig. 4 *E* and *F*). The model that best predicted our observed data (determined with post hoc pair-wise *t* tests, $P < 0.05$) was the sample-always model when the task involved a challenging contrast decrement detection (with the sampling period ≈ 140 ms, ranging from 100 to 190 ms across our eight subjects; Fig. 4 *A, C*, and *E*), whereas the optimal model was a parallel one for an easy version of the same task (with a performance cost of 17% for each additional item to be attended; Fig. 4 *B, D*, and *F*). This distinction was observed for all subjects tested, a result that would be highly unlikely to occur by chance, were these two models assumed to be equivalent ($P < 0.00005$). The sample-when-divided model performed significantly worse than the other two, both in the easy and in the difficult versions of the task (with an optimal sampling period at 660 and 580 ms, respec-

VanRullen et al.

postulated by two-stage theories of visual processing (19–22): it appears, indeed, that attention also operated in this periodic sampling regime when it was focused on a single target location. Without this property, a classic “serial switching” model was shown to perform poorly at explaining human psychometric functions. This may elucidate why, so far, serial switching models have fared relatively poorly in previous attempts at pitting them against parallel models [e.g., Eckstein (13)].

For an easy version of the contrast decrement detection task (i.e., one that generates flat search slopes and probably requires little attention), a parallel allocation of attentional resources to the different potential targets appeared to be a viable strategy. However, the parallel model mainly dictates the spatial distribution of attention during the trials, and not the temporal strategy: we cannot rule out the idea that periodic samples were also taken during this task if we assume that each sample would comprise information from all targets at once. As a side note, the fact that we obtained distinct results in two different versions of the task rules out the possibility that a systematic artifact in our analysis method could be responsible for the better performance of the sample-always model in the difficult contrast decrement detection task.

Of course, the present conclusions are derived from modeling of psychometric functions, which (like all modeling efforts) necessitates making assumptions about psychological processes. There is still the possibility, therefore, that these assumptions and the corresponding models do not cover the entire spectrum of alternatives and that adding assumptions (or free parameters) to a parallel or a classic “serial switching” model might endow it with better prediction accuracy. For example, recent evidence suggests that independent attentional resources exist for the two visual hemifields (25). It is possible that a hybrid model assuming parallel allocation of attention across hemifields, but periodic sampling of information within each hemifield, might better reflect our observers’ performance. This would be an interesting possibility to explore in further model refinements.

If attention, when focused on a single location, samples information periodically like a blinking spotlight, then why have the hundreds of previous studies of attentional mechanisms not revealed this remarkable property? The fact that most experimental paradigms (even those involving electrophysiology) rely on averaging signals across several trials is probably a good place to start looking for an explanation. If the onset of each periodic attentional sample (an internal process) bears no relation to stimulus onset (an external event), such averaging would conceal the effects of periodic attentional sampling to the experimenter. On the other hand, our quantitative method allows us to address, albeit only statistically, the temporal allocation of attention on single trials. Another outstanding possibility could be that our task and experimental conditions are unique for generating this pattern of results. It is true that our conclusions obtained in a task requiring the sustained monitoring of a particular feature (contrast) at multiple static locations may not generalize to studies concerned with transient aspects of attention or to tasks requiring the sustained monitoring of multiple locations independent of featural information (e.g., multiple-object-tracking paradigms). Similarly, we address only spatial aspects of attention, whereas it is well known that some feature-based forms of attention can enhance the processing of a particular feature throughout the entire visual field, i.e., in a nonspatial way (26–28). It would seem, however, that even if the present results were shown to hold only for a very particular form of attention under specific experimental conditions, they would still provide a forceful challenge for current theories of attention, most of which are not equipped to explain our findings—with only a few exceptions (29).

In conclusion, a more profound question beckons: Why should the attentional system adopt the less-than-optimal strategy of not

sampling continuously, especially if there is only one location being sampled? Active periodic sampling of the outside environment is a ubiquitous property of sensory systems: saccades in vision, sniffs in olfaction, whisker movements in rat somatosensation, and even echolocation in bats or electrolocation in the electric fish are all examples of explicit cyclic mechanisms for overt perceptual sampling (30). Attention might have evolved from these periodic processes, as a more economical means of covertly sampling endogenous representations—possibly relying on the widespread oscillations that can be observed in most of these systems (31–40). More simply, it could be that the interplay between information sampling and information processing in the visual system requires the sampling stages to transmit information during particular epochs, rather than continuously; or it could be that the process that directs the sampling must also govern other processing stages and has to alternate between these functions. Whatever the ecological reason (if any) ultimately turns out to be, the suggestion that attention operates periodically will have significant implications for future research.

Experimental Methods

We had eight human observers (three females, five males; age range 25–32) who performed two versions of a task (in separate sessions) involving the detection of a contrast decrement. Subjects were seated in a dimly lit room. Four disk stimuli (radius 1.5° of visual angle) were presented on a gray screen at 4° from fixation in the four cardinal directions (Fig. 1). At the beginning of a block of trials, one to four of the disks were cued as potential targets for this block (the number of cued disks will be referred to as “set size”). Subjects were instructed to focus attention on these disks and ignore others. To minimize the effects of trial and stimulus-onset transients, all disks flickered constantly (even during the intervals between trials and between blocks) with spatiotemporal white noise at maximum contrast (pixel size 0.3°, interval between successive frames 10 ms). A trial lasted for 2 s, and was indicated solely by the presence of the fixation cross. With a 50% probability in each trial, one of the cued disks presented a contrast decrement (the probe), whose duration varied from 50 to 1,000 ms. The task of the subjects was to report whether a decrement had occurred or not, by pressing the appropriate key at the end of the trial. The two versions of the task corresponded to different strengths of the contrast decrement: 50% for the easy version, and 30% for the difficult version. A movie rendition of the task can be downloaded at <http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~rufin/blinkingspotlight/movie1.avi>. Psychometric functions for probe detection as a function of its duration were determined for each subject and set size (between one and four). Additionally, we also determined subjects’ performance outside of the main focus of attention by presenting a number of catch trials (10% probability) in which the contrast decrement was shown in one of the uncued disks. Subjects were instructed to press a separate key if they detected this decrement. Thus, we also determined the psychometric function for performance with minimal attention. This function is critical because it provides a baseline for computing performance in the divided attention conditions (this is true for all three strategies compared; see *SI Appendix*). Half of the observers initially performed the easy version of the task, and the other half began with the difficult version. Each subject performed at least 1,152 trials (six sessions \times four set sizes \times 48 trials) for each version of the task. Two of the observers performed the difficult version of the task a second time (for at least 960 trials each) while their eye positions were monitored by using a binocular infrared eye-tracker at a sampling rate of 120 Hz (ISCAN ETL 200; ISCAN).

After the main experiment, each subject completed two sessions (corresponding to the easy and difficult contrast decrement levels) of a control experiment, in which the cue for potential targets was presented centrally (using one to four

central arrows) at the beginning of each trial. Cue validity was 100%. The probe (contrast decrement) always appeared on one of the cued elements. The probe, when present, remained until the subject's response (a so-called "response-terminated search" procedure), and reaction times were measured as a function of the effective set size (i.e., how many potential targets had been cued on this trial). Each subject performed at least 256 trials (four blocks of 64 trials) for each version of the task. A movie

rendition of this control task can be downloaded at <http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~rufin/blinkingspotlight/movie2.avi>.

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